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TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE LOST IN CYBERSPACE:
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND ON-LINE

DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS
Rachael T. Krueger'

"Do not waste your time looking up the law in advance, because you
can find some federal district court that will sustain any proposition you
make."' Enter the world of cyberspace jurisdiction. As the Supreme
Court remains silent on the issue of personal jurisdiction and the

Internet, courts throughout the country attempt to remedy jurisdictional
confrontations by relying on existing precedent and inventive
jurisdictional tests of their own.2 The mass of inconsistent decisions and
circuit splits provides fresh legal questions that prove chaotic for judicial
benches.3
"The Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication., 4 The Internet allows users to transmit text,
+ J.D.

Candidate, May 2002, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law.

1. Sam Ervin, Jr., Senate Watergate Hearings, reported in the DALLAS TIMES
HERALD, June 20, 1973, quoted in ELIZABETH FROST-KNAPPMAN
SHRAGER, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 277 (Rev. ed. 1998).
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2. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (formulating a test to apply to on-line jurisdictional problems).
3. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850-52 (1997) (explaining and defining the
Internet's history and implications). "The term 'Internet' means the international
computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data
networks." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Supp. Il 1998). "The Internet is not a physical or
tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller
groups of linked computer networks." See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Am. Libraries Ass'n v.
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "[t]he unique nature of the
Internet highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard,
uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never
intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed"); Rodney A. Smolla,
Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future
Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1519 (1987) (describing defamation law as
"dripping with contradictions and confusion").
4. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting Reno, 521 U.S.
at 850). See generally Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44
F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1998); Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404
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images, sound, and video through "cyberspace,, 5 utilizing one of many
Internet service providers (ISPs).6 Both commercial and private entities
employ the international scope of the World Wide Web,
"revolutioniz[ing] the global marketplace." 7
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
noted that the Internet possesses no "territorial boundaries."8 Judge
Nance Gertner stated that "[t]o paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the
Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps 'no there there,' the
'there' is everywhere where there is Internet access." 9 This concept of
omnipresence underlies the problem associated with defamatory
statements 0 on the Internet." Although Internet access is nationwide, no
(E.D. Va. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass.

1997); Zippo Mfg. Co v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Edias
Software Int'l, LLC. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937
F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.
1996); Jewish Def. Org., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999);
Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
5. See WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 4 (1984) (referring to a virtual world
within a computer and the network to which it is attached); see also I. Trotter Hardy, The
ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PIT. L. REV. 993, 994-95 (1994) (evaluating
how legal problems in cyberspace differ from those of actual space).
6. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 544 n.4 (defining ISP as "a company that provides access to
the Internet") (quoting Webopedia, at http://webopedia.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2000)).
7.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION PROJECT,

LONDON MEETING DRAFT 1 (1998) (observing global changes as a result of the Internet);
see also Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 48 n.6 (defining the "web" as "a vast decentralized
collection of documents containing text, visual images, and even audio clips," which is
"designed to be inherently accessible from every Internet site in the world"); Reno, 521
U.S. at 852 (describing the World Wide Web as a network "which allows users to search
for and retrieve information stored in remote computers . . .and consist[ing] of a vast
number of documents stored in different computers all over the world").
8. Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. at 462 (explaining that cyberspace defies traditional
contacts). The Digital court stated that "commercial use of the Internet tests the limits of
these traditional, territorial-based concepts even further." Id.
9. Id. at 462; see also Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that "[t]he Internet may well be the premier technological innovation of the
present age").
10.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1938) (stating that the common law

elements of defamation are: (1) publication, (2) a false and defamatory statement, (3)
about another); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 428 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "defamatory
statement" as "[a] statement that tends to injure the reputation of a person referred to in it
...[t]he statement is likely to lower that person in the estimation of reasonable people
and in particular to cause that person to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt,
ridicule, fear, or dislike"); see also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 69 (1967) (noting that "[a] member of a civilized society should have
some measure of protection against unwarranted attack upon his honor, his dignity and his
standing in the community").
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nationwide jurisdiction for defamation actions exists.2
"[An on-line] defamatory statement ... can be distributed worldwide

in a matter of minutes.,

13

By the year 2003, the estimated on-line

population will be "153.9 million people."

4

Individuals sending messages

into cyberspace, defamatory or not, cannot "purposefully avail"
themselves to all jurisdictions in this country and beyond if a lawsuit
should arise as a result of messages sent over the Internet.'5 However,
each year courts bring non-resident defendants charged with on-line
defamation into their jurisdiction for litigation concerning a simple
message or posting.'
11. Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet: Name-calling in Cyberspace, in LAW
AND THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE 183 (Lillian Edwards & Charlotte
Waelde eds., 1997) (stating that problems arise from the Internet's "speedy transmission
of huge amounts of data simultaneously to multiple destinations, and general lack of
respect for national borders").
12. Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms. Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265, 273 (D.D.C.
1998); see also 143 CONG. REC. E1633 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997). Rep. Goodlatte stated
that: "the Internet is a challenge to the sovereignty of civilized communities, States, and
nations to decide what is appropriate and decent behavior." Id.
13. Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV.
41, 45 (1998) (stating that intentional and unintentional communication are widely
available to "a vast number of people"); see also Edwards, supra note 11, at 183 (asserting
that "users of the Internet are more likely than ordinary citizens to be found publishing
comments which are actionable as defamatory").
14. eMarketer eBusiness Report, available at http://www.emarketer.com/ereports/
edemographics/samplel.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2000) (showing an increase from 102.4
million people using the Internet in the year 2000); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp.
916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining two types of Internet users: (1) those who "can
correspond or exchange views with one or many other Internet users," and (2) those who
can locate and retrieve information available on other computers").
15. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (stating that "it is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State"); see also Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (stating that jurisdiction
exists if the alleged injury "arise[s] out of or relates[s] to" the purposeful activities of the
defendant); Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (holding that
jurisdiction exists because defendant "purposefully directed" activities at the forum state's
residents); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (suggesting that if a defendant
purposefully derives benefit from his or her activities, a court may hold him or her
responsible for any resulting injury).
16. Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 555-58 (N.J. 2000) (holding that
posting a defamatory statement on an electronic bulletin board is sufficient grounds to
constitute minimum contacts because the defendants knew the statements would hurt the
plaintiff in the forum state); see also Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701-702
(E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that posting libelous messages on-line from New Mexico justifies
jurisdiction in Virginia because the Web site was accessible twenty-four hours a day);
Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 406-408 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(holding that a defamatory on-line press release and advertisement constituted grounds
for jurisdiction because of its perpetual accessibility). But see Washington Post Co. v.
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The past provides an uncertain legal framework for the future, and the
future finds itself amidst the rise of Internet lawsuits.'7 Without guidance
from the Supreme Court in the area of on-line defamation and without
an established jurisdictional test for such crime, the resulting precedent
produced by courts across the country remains inconsistent.' These
inconsistencies allow some computer users and potential plaintiffs a
clever way of gaining jurisdiction over defendants they would otherwise
have to travel across the country to sue.19
This Comment first explains the law concerning personal jurisdiction
prior to the popular use of the Internet, including the prevalent tests and
existing precedent for defamation actions. Next, this Comment examines
the manner in which United States courts have applied the established
law of personal jurisdiction to cases involving defamatory statements on
the Internet. This Comment then examines recent case law pertaining to
on-line defamation and the application of specific jurisdictional tests
employed by courts across the country. This Comment's analysis
includes a discussion of the problems that arise when courts attempt to
define new technology by legal standards. While recognizing that
technological advances often alter societal and judicial norms, this
Comment asserts that the existing precedent set by the Supreme Court
satisfies all jurisdictional situations of today, including those situations
Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 294 (1919) (declaring that "[w]hatever a man publishes he
publishes at his peril").
17. See Steven Betensky, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 19 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 (1998)
(exploring why there have been so many cases involving Internet jurisdiction in the recent
past).
18. Compare Bochan, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 702-03 (holding jurisdiction is proper);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57-58 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding jurisdiction is
proper); Telco Communications, 977 F. Supp. at 408 (holding jurisdiction is proper); Edias
Software Int'l v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) (holding jurisdiction is
proper), with GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1352 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (holding that jurisdiction does not exist); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F.
Supp. 2d 717, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that jurisdiction does not exist); Mallinckrodt
Med. Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265, 272-73 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that
jurisdiction does not exist); Jewish Def. Org., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611,
621-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that jurisdiction does not exist).
19. Betensky, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that the increase of Internet jurisdiction
litigation may be the result of a "get on the band wagon" phenomenon). The rapid growth
of computer use provokes some to believe that the potential plaintiffs are thinking: "This
is a really nifty way of getting jurisdiction over someone that I'd otherwise have to go
across the country to sue." Id. at 2. But see Leonard Klingbaum, Bensusan Rest. Corp. v.
King: An Erroneous Application of Personal Jurisdiction Law to Internet-based Contacts,
19 PACE L. REV. 149, 187 (1998) (stating that "[tlhe fear of being haled into every distant
court, however, may be unfounded" because the due process analysis established by the
Supreme Court will prevent "unfair assertions of personal jurisdiction, even after an
electronic contact is deemed constitutionally satisfactory").
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involving on-line defamation. Finally, this Comment suggests a renewed
concentration on human volition, physical activity and location, and an
avoidance of concentrating on the interpretation of computer activity on
Web sites.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: APPLICATIONS PRECEDING AND
SUCCEEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF THE INTERNET
A. Brief Overview of PersonalJurisdiction:From Pennoyerto the Present
As established in Pennoyer v. Neff, The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution limits states'
authority to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 2° In the
landmark personal jurisdiction case, International Shoe v. Washington,"
the Supreme Court stated that a court must not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" in its attempt to obtain
jurisdiction over a defendant. 2 An assertion of jurisdiction necessitates
that the defendant have minimum "contacts, ties or relations" with the

forum state in order for a judgment to be binding.

As a result of these

20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled in part by, Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1947). The Court held that states may exercise jurisdiction over people
within their territory but not over people outside their territory. Id.; see also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (stating that "[a] judgment
rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering state and is not entitled to full
faith and credit elsewhere"); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91 (stating that "[t]he Due Process Clause
... operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting
rights or interests of non-resident defendants").
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id. at 316 (stating that "due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it") (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987). In the deeply divided plurality opinion of Asahi, the Court presented factors used
to determine the reasonableness of jurisdiction: "A court must consider the burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief."
Id. at 113; see also Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (9th Cir.
1993) (interpreting the Supreme Court standard concerning reasonableness). The CoreVent court listed seven factors necessary in determining the reasonableness of exercising
jurisdiction:
(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state's
affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent
of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state; (4) the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of
the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in
convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.
Id. at 1487-88.
23. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
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contacts, the defendant could "reasonably anticipate[] being haled into
court there., 24 In addition, personal jurisdiction does not require a
defendant's physical presence in the forum state; proper jurisdiction may
be found upon a "substantial and continuing relationship" with entities in
the forum state.25
A court must obtain one of two types of jurisdiction over a defendant:
A court will exercise general
specific or general jurisdiction.26
jurisdiction when the defendant's actions that give rise to the lawsuit are
unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum state.27 In order to
assert general jurisdiction, the defendant's activities with the forum state
must be "systematic and continuous., 28 An assertion of specific

1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "[w]hether sufficient minimum contacts to
obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant can be established solely through the use of
computers and electronic communications is a new issue under due process
jurisprudence," and that courts "have recognized that such communications via computer
are of a different nature").
24. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (distinguishing foreseeability as "not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State," but that "the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 218 (1977) (ordering "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign").
25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (finding personal
jurisdiction to exist "[blecause Rudzewicz established a substantial and continuing
relationship with Burger King's Miami headquarters, received fair notice from the
contract documents and the course of dealing that he might be subject to suit in Florida,
and has failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum would otherwise be
fundamentally unfair"); see also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
(stating that a "substantial connection" with the forum state sustains jurisdiction).
26. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). The
Court stated that:
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a
State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are
sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.
Id; see also Panavision tnt'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be founded on either general or specific
jurisdiction").
27. See supra note 26; see also Ann K. Moceyunas & Janine Anthony Bowen,
Personal Jurisdiction in the On-line Context, 5 CYBER. LAW. 5, 6 (2000) ("[T]he
Constitution requires that the defendant's contacts with the forum state be 'substantial' or
'continuous and systematic.' General jurisdiction requires more contacts than specific
jurisdiction.").
28. See supra notes 26-27; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining "general jurisdiction" as "[a] court's authority to hear all claims against a
defendant, at the place of the defendant's domicile or the place of service, without any
showing that a connection exists between the claims and the forum state").
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jurisdiction necessitates "minimum contacts" with the forum state, 29 and
the defendant's alleged actions and forum contacts must be related."'
Although all states employ these constitutional ideals, incongruities

among jurisdictions emerge when a comparison of long-arm statutes,
which control the ability of a state to hale a non-resident defendant into

court, is undertaken.31 Generally, a defendant must satisfy both the
constitutional "minimum contacts" requirement and the state's long-arm
statute to be brought to court within its boundaries.32

These statutes

29. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "specific jurisdiction" as "[j]urisdiction that
stems from the defendant's having certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that
the court may hear a case whose issues arise from those minimum contacts"); Panavision,
141 F.3d at 1320 (applying a three-part test for specific jurisdiction in an Internet
trademark action). The Panavision court's test stated that:
(1) The non-resident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposely avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises
out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of
jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Id.
30. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478-80; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984);
see also Moceyunas & Bowen, supra note 27, at 6 (stating that forum contacts "must be the
result of 'targeting of the forum state and its residents.' Contacts that are random,
fortuitous, and attenuated are insufficient").
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a "long arm statute" as
"[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant... ").In Virginia, for
example, a court may establish jurisdiction over a non-resident that, among
aforementioned constitutional requirements, "regularly does or solicits business" in
Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(i) (Michie 2000). Conversely, California's
long-arm statute simply mirrors the constitutional requirements. See CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1991) (stating that "[a] court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States");
see also Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal
Jurisdictionfor the Twenty-first Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 392 (1998) (asserting that
long-arm jurisdiction presents courts with the most problems).
32. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"federal courts apply the law of the forum state, subject to the limits of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1329 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "[w]hether the Court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant requires a two-part inquiry" that "first examines whether
personal jurisdiction exists under [the forum state's] long-arm statute," and then "the
Court must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due
process"); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1990) (stating
that "[tlhe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state
court to render a valid personal judgment against a non-resident defendant"); Int'l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316 (declaring that a defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the
forum]"); see also Moceyunas & Bowen, supra note 27, at 6 (stating that a "non-resident
defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in a federal court to the extent permitted by
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provide one reason for conflicting decisions among courts concerning
their jurisdictional holdings in on-line defamation cases.33 Therefore, in
order to gain personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a court must find
either specific or general jurisdiction and that the action falls under the
state's long-arm statute.
B. TraditionalApproaches to the Problem of PersonalJurisdictionin
Defamation Actions
1. Priorto the Internet: The Supreme Court's Standard
The Court's concentration on "the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation 3 4 is a fundamental tenant in determining
personal jurisdiction in defamation actions.35 Courts also determine
whether a forum is proper by ascertaining where the defamatory
statement occurred.36 For example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,37 the
Court analyzed both circulation and distribution of a magazine,
determining that Hustler's regular activities (i.e., circulation) in the
forum state established personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
libel action.3"
Calder v. Jones,39 a separate libel action that posed a jurisdictional
question similar to Keeton, was decided the same day.40 In Calder, the
National Enquirer published an allegedly defamatory article about
Shirley Jones, a California resident.4' The petitioners, including the42
in Florida
newspaper, its editor, and the author of the article, resided
the state court in which the federal court resides").
33. See supranote 31 (defining long-arm statute with examples).
34. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
35. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (citing this relationship as necessary in judging minimum
contacts in the defamation action before the Court); see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465
U.S. 770, 775 (1984) (stating that "a court properly focuses on" this relationship in judging
minimum contacts).
36. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777 (stating that "[t]he tort of libel is generally held to occur
wherever the offending material is circulated") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577A, cmt. A (1977)); see supra note 10 (defining defamatory statement).
37. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
38. Id. at 781 (stating that the defendant had "continuously and deliberately
exploited the [forum state's] market," and therefore should expect such a suit to arise).
39. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
40. Both Keeton and Calder's decisions dealt with libelous statements made by
magazine distributors. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v.
Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
41. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 n.9 ("The article alleged that the respondent drank so
heavily as to prevent her from fulfilling her professional obligations.").
42. Id. at 785-86.
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of California's jurisdiction.43

However, the Court held that California was the proper jurisdiction
because the state was "the focal point of both the story and of the harm
suffered.""
The Court determined that the "effects" of the petitioners' activities in
California provided a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.4 ' The Calder Court
employed a three-part test that defined the requirements for exercising
jurisdiction in tortious cases:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) [t]he
plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the
forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by
the plaintiff as a result of that tort; (3) [t]he defendant expressly
aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the
46 forum can
be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.
This test is still employed by courts facing jurisdictional questions in
defamation actions, including the new breed of Internet defamation
cases. 47 Calderstands as a useful, analytical method for courts navigating
48
through on-line defamation cases.
2. After the Rise of the Internet: TraditionalApplications and the
Implementation of Calder
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, in Edias
Software International,LLC v. Basis International Ltd.,49 analyzed non43. Id. at 789 (explaining the petitioners' argument "that they are not responsible for
the circulation of the article in California," and that mere foreseeability cannot suffice for
jurisdiction).
44. Id. at 788-89 (asserting that the article, which used California sources, focused on
a California resident whose professional career remained in California).
45. Id. at 789 (stating that "the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's
emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in
California").
46. Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting
Calder).
47. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (using
Calder to sustain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who targeted the plaintiff for
domain-name extortion); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (using the "effects test" of Calder to analyze the relationship between the
defamatory statements and the forum state); Edias Software Int'l. v. Basis Int'l. Ltd., 947
F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996) (citing the "effects test" as support for jurisdiction); Cal.
Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (C.D. Ca. 1986) (using
Calder's rationale to find jurisdiction over defendant who sent defamatory statements
through an Internet-like network).
48. Sheehan, supra note 31, at 401-02 (stating that Calder and Keeton had "special
relevance to potential cyberspace litigation").
49. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
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Internet related contacts to find jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant in an Internet defamation action. 0 In Edias, the defendant, a
New Mexico company, posted a defamatory press release message on its
CompuServe Web page and in an on-line forum about the plaintiff, an
Arizona company.5 ' To determine the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant, the court considered four factors: (1) the
extent of the defendant's purposeful availment; (2) the burden on the
defendant to litigate in Arizona; (3) sovereignty conflicts; and (4)
Arizona's interest in adjudicating this dispute. 52
The Edias court, utilizing these four factors and the Calder "effects
test," focused on the defendant's contacts with the forum state which
included email, phone, and fax communications, as well as a contract.53
The court concluded that these contacts were sufficient to establish a
proper exercise of jurisdiction in the forum state, and affirmatively
declared the reasonableness of the lawsuit.
Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., a recent case employing Calder's
rationale, addressed personal jurisdiction in an on-line defamatory
context.55 In Blakey, a female pilot and Washington resident brought a
defamation action in New Jersey against her employer, Continental
Airlines, for statements posted on the employer's "electronic bulletin
board. '5 6 The appeals court stated that activity on an electronic bulletin
50. Id. at 421 (stating that "BASIS [defendant] has purposefully availed itself of the
protections and privileges of Arizona law based on the contractual relationship between
[the defendant] and [the plaintiff], and [the defendant's] accompanying activities in
Arizona, in addition to the dissemination of allegedly defamatory statements about [the
plaintiff] on [the defendant's Web page").
51. Id. at 415.
52. Id. at 421-22 (concluding that as a fifth factor, the "most convenient resolution"
would occur in Arizona).
53. Id. at 417.
54. Id. at 421-22 (concluding that "Arizona has an interest in adjudicating a claim that
affects an Arizona company"). The Edias court also utilized the Calder"effects test" in its
analysis. Id. at 420; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). The effects test
"focuses on the tortious act by a non-resident defendant that results in injury in the forum
state." Id. at 788-89.
55. Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 555 (N.J. 2000).
56. Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 730 A.2d 854, 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999);
see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (explaining that "one person can reach many other users through bulletin board
services, newsgroups and numerous other Internet-based means of communication");
United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 417 n.4 (N.D. I11.1990) (defining "computer
bulletin board" as "[a] computer program that simulates an actual bulletin board by
allowing computer users who access a particular computer to post messages, read existing
messages, and delete messages"); It's in the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[p]osting a message to the SportsNet bulletin board is a
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board involves restricted access to a "relatively small group and is further
restricted by personal choice, purchase of equipment and payment of
57 a

fee [and] is not an act purposefully or foreseeably aimed at this state.,

On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
lower court's decision that prohibited New Jersey jurisdiction.58 The

court determined that defamatory statements published with the intent
to inflict harm in the forum state satisfied the minimum contacts and
fairness requirements of InternationalShoe, and concluded that the New
Jersey court was a proper jurisdiction for the defamation action. 9 This
holding imitates the Calder effects test. Similarly, the Blakey 60court
focused on the intentional effects of the contacts in the forum state.
Conversely, the court
in Mallinckrodt Medical v. Sonus
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 found no jurisdiction over Sonus, a Seattle
corporation that posted defamatory statements about Mallinckrodt on an
AOL electronic bulletin board. 6' The court found that Sonus could not
be reached by the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, and that
posting a message on an AOL electronic bulletin board "is not an act63
purposefully or foreseeably aimed at the District of Columbia.,
Although the Mallinckrodt court never cited Calder, it employed
Calder's rationale by searching for the effects of the defamatory message
in the forum state and concluded that none existed. 64 The Mallinckrodt
court suggested that "no nationwide jurisdiction for defamation actions"
exists, 6 and "the advent of the Internet and Internet service providers

random communication of computerized message analogous to posting a written notice on
a public bulletin board, not a publication that appears at regular intervals"); James F.
Brelsford, Online Content Liability Issues, 611 PLI/Pat 505, 514 (2000) (stating that the
"riskiest activity is operating [electronic] bulletin boards, because under common law a
system operator or Web site owner can face liability for statements made by others on
those boards").
57. Blakey, 730 A.2d at 867.
58. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 558-59.
59. Id. at 556. The court further stated that "we do not believe that it is unfair that
the forum where the discrimination took place should exercise jurisdiction over the
allegations of defamatory retaliatory harassment." Id. at 557.
60. Id. at 556.
61. 989 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1998).
62. Id. at 272-73.
63. Id. at 272 (supporting its position by citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261-68 (6th
Cir. 1996); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-27 (W.D. Pa.
1997); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
64. Mallinckrodt, 989 F. Supp. at 272-73.
65. Id. at 273 (citing McFarlane v. Esquire Mag., 74 F.3d 1296, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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such as AOL does not change that fact."66

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,

reinforced
the
notion that a Web site alone does not by itself suffice for
....
67
jurisdiction.

Initially, the lower court noted the peculiar nature of an

interactive Web site as a non-resident defendant's sole contact with the
forum,6" but found jurisdiction over the defendant under the long-arm
statute based on that contact. 6 ' Therefore, the lower court held it could
exercise jurisdiction based entirely upon one Internet contact.
On appeal, the circuit court disagreed, stating that despite satisfying
the long-arm statute, "a plaintiff must still show that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is within the permissible bounds of the Due Process
Clause."'" The court held that an interactive Web site did not satisfy
"minimum contacts," and the theory of holding otherwise "simply cannot
hold water.

7

1

In other words, a non-resident defendant must have more

than one on-line contact with a forum to be subject to jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia.
In Northwest Airlines v. Friday7

4

another recent on-line defamation

action, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota ignored the Calder
principles.7 ' Relying upon Minnesota's long-arm statute that contains a
provision stating that no jurisdiction shall be found if a defendant

66. Id. (stating that someone could "have read the message and reacted negatively
towards plaintiffs").
67. GTE, 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Although not a defamation action, the
court's holding could pertain to future on-line defamation actions.
68. Id. at 1345 (stating that "[a]ll of the interactive Website cases reviewed [by the
District Court] involved defendants with at least some physical contact with the forum")
(quoting GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., Order Certifying for
Interlocutory Appeal the Court's Ruling That Personal Jurisdiction Exists and Staying
Proceedings, at 3, reprinted in J.A. 218).
69. Id. at 1346. The lower court held that "GTE had sufficiently alleged a tortious
injury in the District caused by the defendants' acts outside of the District." Id.
70. Id. at 1346.
71. Id. at 1347; see also Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (stating that "[tihe [I]nternet, a new and rapidly developing means of mass
communication and information exchange, raises difficult questions regarding the scope of
the court's personal jurisdiction in the context of due process jurisprudence").
72. GTE, 199 F.3d. at 1350.
73.

See generally Michele

N.

Breen,

Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:

"Shoehorning" Cyberspace into International Shoe, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 791
(1998) (noting the judicial split in cases involving jurisdiction based solely on Internet
contacts).
74. 617 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
75. Id. at 592-93 (holding that no jurisdiction exists without any analysis of effects).
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"[c]ommits any act outside Minnesota causing injury.., in Minnesota...
[if] the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy.
This case involved electronic mail sent by defendants in Washington to
"Minnesota and elsewhere," and then published in newspapers circulated
in the Twin Cities area.77 In its analysis, the court focused entirely on the
act of making the defamatory statement." Because the defamatory
statement originated in Washington, not Minnesota, the applicable law
was the long-arm statute "with its explicit exception for defamation
actions." 9
Although the court invited the legislature to reconsider the long-arm
statute in anticipation of similar cases in the future, this court rejected
the suggestion that "'the phenomenon and power' of the Internet
justifies a different result."' Although the court did not implement the
"effects test," and it ignored the idea of Internet presence in the
footsteps of the aforementioned cases, it employed the traditional
principles of its long-arm statute to determine the propriety of
jurisdiction and ignored the idea of Internet presence in the footsteps of
the aforementioned cases.
C. The Introduction of the Zippo Sliding Scale Test
1. The Zippo Court: A Three-ProngApproach to PersonalJurisdiction
and the Internet
Although not a defamation case, in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo
Dot Coin, Inc.,"' the United States District Court for the Western District
76. MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subdivision 1(d)(1999) (stating additionally that
jurisdiction shall not be found if "Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a
forum," or "the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the state's
jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice").
77. Northwest, 617 N.W.2d at 592. Northwest Airlines sued Friday for "defamation
and business disparagement" after a Northwest pilot's wife sent out a press release via
email concerning alleged safety violations at Northwest. Id.
78. Id. at 593 (stating the necessity to focus on the act of making the defamatory
statement as "the operative act for the purpose of determining whether the act was 'in
Minnesota' for the purpose of the long arm statute").
79. Id. at 594 (clarifying that the act in question "was sending allegedly defamatory
email press releases," not receiving the email; therefore, "the relevant provision of the
long-arm statute is subdivision 1(d)").
80. Id. at 594-95; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) (stating that
"[c]yberspace is malleable," and therefore, "it is possible to construct barriers in
cyberspace ...");Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 207-08 (1996) (arguing that traditional principles can be applied to the
Internet, and that a "law of cyberspace" exists no more than a "law of the horse" exists).
81. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). The Zippo court faced a jurisdictional
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of Pennsylvania produced a "sliding scale" test for Internet jurisdiction
that many courts have applied to on-line defamation cases."'
According to the Zippo sliding scale test, there are three categories of
Internet defendants. 83
The first category includes non-resident
defendants who are "clearly [doing] business over the Internet" with a
resident of the forum state including entering into contracts and
"repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet."'' 4 The court
held that "personal jurisdiction is proper" for this category of users."
The second category, known as a "passive website," includes a defendant
who "[posts] information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to
users in foreign jurisdictions," and is not sufficient grounds for
jurisdiction." The final category encompasses the "middle ground . . .
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information
with the host computer . . .. ,
In this situation, the court held that
"jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the
'
Web site."88
The Zippo court referenced numerous Supreme Court cases before
defining an analytical method for personal jurisdiction in the context of
the Internet.89 Building upon that foundation, the Zippo court used the
analyses of a number of recent, non-controlling precedent to formulate

question arising out of an on-line trademark dilution action. Id. at 1121. The Zippo court
noted that "[w]ith this global revolution looming on the horizon, the development of the
law concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its
infant stages." Id. at 1123.
82. Id. at 1124; see, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68
F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998);
Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1998); Jewish
Def. Org., Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
83. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (describing characteristics of all three categories in its
"sliding scale" test of minimum contacts).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1122-23 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978));
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984); Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Keeton v.
Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957)). The Zippo court discussed these cases under a section labeled "The Traditional
Framework." Id.
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its new sliding scale test90 The Zippo court justified its departure from
traditional solutions by quoting the Court in Hanson v. Denckla:9' "[A]s

technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
States, the need for jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase."

92

2. Zippo Followers: On-line Defamation Cases in Which Courts
DetermineJurisdictionBased on "Passive" Web Sites
In 1997, the district court in Telco Communications v. An Apple a
Day93 cited the Zippo court's passive Web site definition in its opinion. 94
Despite the defendant's arguable passivity, the Telco court determined

that a non-resident who utilizes on-line advertising will not escape
jurisdiction. 5

In this case, Telco, a Virginia Corporation, claimed that its stock prices
were depressed when the defendant, An Apple a Day, a Missouri
96

corporation, released two defamatory press releases over the Internet.

The court found jurisdiction proper because the defendant "conducted
[its] advertising and soliciting over the Internet, which could be accessed
by a Virginia resident [twenty-four] hours a day . . . . .9'The court
concluded that the defendants' contacts met Virginia's long-arm statute.98

90. Id. at 123-25 (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996));
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-48 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Panavision Int'l., L.P. v.
Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp.
161 (D. Conn 1996); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. Sys.
One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351(Fla. App. 1994)). The Zippo court analyzed
these cases under the section "The Internet and Jurisdiction." Id.
91. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
92. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51). The Zippo court
also cited Burger King in which the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is an inescapable fact
of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of commercial business is transacted
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for
physical presence within a State in which business is conducted." Id. (citing Burger King,
471 U.S. at 476).
93. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
94. Id. at 406 (citing Zippo and stating that "[a] passive Web site that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction").
95. Id. at 407 (declaring that "posting a Web site advertisement or solicitation
constitutes a persistent course of conduct").
96. Id. at 405 (stating that Telco alleged defamation, tortious interference, and
conspiracy to harm business).
97. Id. at 407.
98. Id. (stating that "the Defendants [solicited business] regularly for purposes of the
long-arm statute"); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4) (Michie 2001 Supplement)
(stating that a court may exercise jurisdiction if a defendant causes "tortious injury in this
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The Telco court stated that the Internet's effect "expand[ed]
jurisdictional bounds."99 The Telco court is not alone in its rationale;
similar decisions have preceded and followed Telco.O""
In Bochan v. La Fontaine,'' the court employed logic similar to that in
Telco." 2 In 1999, the Bochan court faced a libel action "novel" to its
bench and unfamiliar to other jurisdictions."'3 Defendants from New
Mexico and Texas, through a USENET Internet newsgroup,"14 posted
defamatory statements about the plaintiff, a resident of Virginia.' 5 The
court framed the issue by stating, "the question is whether the La
Fontaines [the defendants] committed a tort (i.e., libel) in Virginia by
posting certain [defamatory] messages to an Internet newsgroup via
AOL and Earthlink.net." '6
The Virginia court determined that it could exercise jurisdiction on
non-resident defendants because they use an Internet account on a
"Virginia-based service, to publish the allegedly defamatory
statements."" 7 The New Mexico resident did not use AOL, and could

Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if [that defendant]
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this
Commonwealth").
99. Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406.
100. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn 1996).
Although Inset is not a defamation case, the Telco court relied upon Inset's reasoning in its
opinion. Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406. The Inset court held that "the posting of an Internet
advertisement satisfied a showing of 'repeatedly solicit' under the Connecticut long-arm
statute," and the Telco court endorsed this holding in its own. Id.; see also Bochan v. La
Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701 (E.D. Va. 1999) (stating that the defendant's on-line
advertising met Virginia's business solicitation requirements "through its web site
accessible to Virginia Internet users 24 hours a day," although no sales are conducted
through the Web site).
101. 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999).
102. Id. at 698, 703 (relying on Telco for guidance and ultimately holding that an online advertisement accessible twenty-four hours a day satisfied Virginia's long-arm statute
for jurisdiction).
103. Id. at 698 (stating that "[t]his, as it happens, is a novel question in Virginia and
there do not appear to be any decisions from other jurisdictions that are factually
identical").
104. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834-35 (E.D. Pa. 1996), af d, Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (describing USENET newsgroups as "peer to peer connections
between approximately 200,000 computers ... around the world").
105. Bochan, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
106. Id. at 698.
107. Id. at 699 (establishing that because "the use of USENET server in Virginia was
integral to that publication, there is a sufficient act in Virginia to satisfy § 8.01328.1(A)(3)" of Virginia's long-arm statute).
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not be haled into court under the Virginia long-arm statute.' 8 Instead,
the court determined that the New Mexico resident "solicited business in
Virginia by promoting and advertising his computer hardware company
on the Internet through its Website, accessible to Virginia Internet users
24 hours a day."' 9 Therefore, the court found proper jurisdiction over

the New Mexico resident."
Although on-line advertisements satisfied the jurisdictional thresholds
of both the Telco and Bochan courts, other benches have required more
traditional, non-Internet related contacts with the forum state before
exercising jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
D. The Combinationof JurisdictionalTests in On-line Defamation Cases
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,"' the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia utilized both a Zippo analysis of on-line activity and
an analysis of non-Internet related contacts."' This defamation action
pertained to an article published on an Internet gossip column and
distributed to direct subscribers through email. ' The long-arm statute
presented the court with this issue: "whether defendant Drudge (1)
regularly does or solicits business in the District of Columbia, or (2)
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in the 4District, or (3) engages in any other persistent course of
'
conduct here."

1

The Blumenthal court stated that the existence of a home page on the

Internet does not, by itself, suffice for proper jurisdiction."'

Instead, the

108. Id. at 700 (noting that "there is nothing in the record to suggest that Harris
committed any tortious act in Virginia within the meaning of" Virginia's long-arm statute).
109. Id. at 701 (stating that "Federal courts in Virginia in particular have generally
found that Internet advertising accessible to Virginia residents 24 hours a day constitutes
solicitation of business in Virginia sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 8.01328.1(A)(4)"). See supra note 98 (listing the requirements of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01328.1(A)(4)).
110. Bochan, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
111. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 46-47. Defendant Drudge published the following statement on the
Internet: "The DRUDGE REPORT has learned that top GOP operatives who feel there
is a double-standard of only reporting republican shame believe they are holding an ace
card: New White House recruit Sidney Blumenthal has a spousal abuse past that has been
effectively covered up." Id. at 40.
114. Id. at 53-54 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(4)). This section of the D.C.
Code and VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-328.I(A)(4) are nearly identical. See supra note 98
(listing requirements of VA. CODE. ANN, § 8.01-328.1(A)(4)).
115. Id. at 56 (stating that a Web site "must also allow browsers to interact directly
with the Web site on some level").
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Web site must be interactive, and there must be "other non-Internet
related contacts between the defendant and the forum state ....", The
court determined that the defendant's interactive, national Web site,
which was "accessible to and used by District of Columbia residents,"
and the defendant's "persistent course of conduct" in D.C., including
interviews and visits met both the necessary threshold factors of an
interactive Web site and non-Internet related contacts. 117
In Barrett v. Catacombs Press,'8 the court utilized both Zippo and
Calder."9 In Barrett, the defendant published defamatory statements on
two informational Web sites and posted links to these Web sites on
national listserves and discussion groups.'20 The Barrett court utilized the
Zippo sliding scale and labeled the defendant's Web sites as "passive,"
and, therefore, denied jurisdiction over the defendant." '
Employing Calder, the Barrett court found that the defendant did not
direct the on-line defamatory statements to the forum state.22 The court
stated that although the forum state received the defamatory statement
at issue, the forum state's residents "are but a fraction of other
worldwide Internet
users who have received or viewed such
' 23
statements.'
A few months after Barrett, the Courts of Appeal of California
similarly combined the rationales of Zippo and Calder. 24 The court used
the "passive" quality of a Web site to deny jurisdiction over a defendant
in Jewish Defense Fund Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court.25 This
court reiterated that "the appropriate jurisdictional analysis should be to
determine whether or not it was foreseeable that a risk of injury by

116. Id.
117. Id. The court stated that the political nature of the defendant's Web site
automatically targeted D.C., that the defendant "solicited contributions from District
residents via the Drudge Report's homepage," and that the "non-Internet related" visits
to and interviews in D.C. contributed to establishing personal jurisdiction. Id. at 57.
118. 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
119. Id. at 727-30.
120. Id. at 727.
121. Id. (stating "passive" Web sites are insufficient as grounds for jurisdiction).
122. Id. at 731 (maintaining that "[u]nder the 'effects test' of Calder, we do not find
that such defamatory statements amount to actions 'expressly aimed' at Pennsylvania, [the
forum state]").
123. Id. (stating further that the forum state must be "targeted" by a non-resident in
order "to satisfy due process," despite "the fact that harm is felt" in the forum state).

124. Jewish Def. Fund Org., Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1057-61
(Cal. Cat. App. 1999).
125. Id. at 1060.
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The court denied
defamation would arise in the forum state.' ' 126
the effects of a passive Web site are not
jurisdiction, concluding that
27
foreseeable in its forum.

II. AN ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL CONTACTS, THE CALDER EFFECTS
TEST AND THE ZIPPO SLIDING SCALE, AS USED BY COURTS IN ON-LINE
DEFAMATION ACTIONS
A. TraditionalContacts, TraditionalStandards:Ignoring Internet
Presence
The majority of courts that employed traditional personal jurisdiction
standards acknowledged the phenomenon of the Internet, but refused to
allow new technology to change their holdings.2 8 Other courts realized
that on-line contacts often did not satisfy minimum contacts, and,
terminal in order to
therefore reached beyond the defendant's computer
2

exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. 1
The tests to be satisfied in these courts remain identical to those found
above in the discussion surrounding traditional applications." 0 For
example, a defendant must have certain contact with the forum state. 3'

126. Id. at 1058 (citing Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China
Fellowship, 146 Cal. App. 3d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). The court also established that
"the 'purposeful availment' requirement for specific jurisdiction can be satisfied by the
'effects test,' set out in Calder v. Jones." Id. at 1057.
127. Id. at 1060; see also Alex Gigante, Internet Defamation and PersonalJurisdiction,
601 PLI/Pat 309, 318 (2000) (stating that "[i]n the Internet context ... the 'effects test'
does not change the passive-active dichotomy," and citing Jewish Defense Organization for
support).
128. New York v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (stating that
"although Internet transactions might appear to pose novel jurisdictional issues,
traditional jurisdictional standards have proved to be sufficient to resolve all civil Internet
jurisdictional issues raised to date, refuting the view of '[s]ome commentators [who]
believe a new body of jurisprudence is needed to address' questions of personal
jurisdiction and the Internet") (citation omitted); see also sources cited supra note 80 and
accompanying text (stating that the introduction of the Internet does not change the
nature of personal jurisdiction); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction
in Cyberspace, 32 INT'L LAW. 1167, 1167 (1998) (stating that "there is nothing about legal
relations over computer networks that in any way challenges our conventional notions
about how sovereign authority is allocated in the world").
129. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining
other non-Internet related contacts must exist in addition to an interactive Web site);
Edias Software Int'l, LLC v. Basis Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(including off-line contacts such as phone calls, faxes, and contracts to find jurisdiction
over the defendant).
130. See supra notes 34-48 (discussing traditional personal jurisdiction tests prior to the
Internet).
131. See Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 313, 319 (1945).
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Likewise, the Supreme Court stated that a non-resident must have "fair
notice"'' 32 that he or she may be brought into a foreign jurisdiction.
In
addition, the Supreme Court accepted the exercise of jurisdiction even if
"the defendant did not physically enter the forum State,"'' 34 a mantra
necessary in on-line
defamation cases in which the defendant rarely visits
135

the forum state.

The on-line defamation cases that employed traditional concepts of
jurisdiction followed Supreme Court precedent and applied the ideals of
"minimum contacts" and "purposeful availment" in the name of due

process.13 '

Additionally, the long-arm statutes of each state must

establish detailed guidelines and explanations of such contacts and
availment. "' For example, soliciting business in a forum state suffices for
jurisdiction in most states.' 3 In another action, the long-arm statute
dictated jurisdiction on the basis of a defamatory statement's origin. 131
The Supreme Court recognized as early as 1958 that the "technological
progress" affecting commerce, communications, and transportation
required more flexible personal jurisdiction standards. 140 However, the
132. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985); supra note 25 (giving a
detailed explanation of Burger King); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (declaring that "[w]here a federal statute or regulation fails to supply a
fair warning of what will give rise to criminal liability, it violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment").
133. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
774 (1984)).
134. Id. at 476 (emphasis added) (stating that "it is an inescapable fact of modern
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire
communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a
State in which business is conducted").
135. BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER xi-xii (1992) (defining "cyberspace" as "[t]he place between the
phones . . . [tihe indefinite place out there, where the two of you, two human beings,
actually meet and communicate").
136. See discussion supra notes 15, 20-26 (explaining the history of personal
jurisdiction); Panavision Int'l, Inc. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating
that "[t]he purposeful availment requirement ensures that a non-resident defendant will
not be haled into court based upon 'random, fortuitous or attenuated' contacts with the
forum state") (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). But see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn 1996) (holding that the defendant "purposely
availed itself of the privilege of doing business with [the forum state]" by posting on-line
advertisements continuously available to all Internet users which is an arguably random
contact with a forum state).
137. See supra note 31 (defining long-arm statute and giving examples).
138. See supra note 31.
139. See supra note 78 (explaining that the Northwest court based its decision to deny
jurisdiction on Minnesota's long-arm statute concerning the origin of defamation).
140. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (acknowledging that defending an
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Court acknowledged that "it is a mistake to assume that this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction
of state courts.' 4' This mentality is echoed by those courts falling under
category: the Internet will not change jurisdictional
the "traditional"
42
restrictions.
B. The Use of the Calder Effects Test.- Keeping TraditionalDefamation
Standards
Established in 1984, the Calder effects test is one component of the
Courts
traditional Supreme Court precedent discussed above.1 43
implementing Calder do so in a manner similar to the subset of courts in
the previous section with a caveat, these courts do not ignore 44the
statements.
Internet's role in sending, posting, or relaying defamatory
The Calder court articulated that "[e]ach defendant's contacts with the
forum State must be assessed individually,"'145 and that if a victim felt the
"brunt of the harm," i.e., the "effects," of the injury in the forum state,
jurisdiction may be proper. 46 In on-line defamation cases, defendants
effectuate harm through using the Internet. Courts implementing the
Calder test assess the effects of that on-line harm by analyzing case-

action "in a foreign tribunal [is] less burdensome" than it was in the past).
141. Id. at 251 (quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957)); see also
Developments In the Law--The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1617 (1999)
(stating that "[t]he emergence of cyberspace as a new locus for defamation does not mean
that Internet defamation is an entirely 'new' legal issue that necessarily requires radical
changes in constitutional doctrine").
142. See sources cited and discussion supra note 80 (stating that the introduction of the
Internet does not change the nature of personal jurisdiction); see also Sheehan, supra note
31, at 438 n.320 (stating that "[it is not clear why the result of technology expanding one's
contacts and transactions should be a rule contracting one's exposure to suit"); Stein,
supra note 128, at 1179 (stating that "on both a practical and conceptual level, resolving
personal jurisdiction issues is crucial to our assessment of whether cyberspace challenges
existing jurisdictional paradigms").
143. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (creating an "effects test"
to be used in personal jurisdiction queries involving defamation).
144. See, e.g., Edias Software Int'l, LLC v. Basis Int'l, Lts., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (finding that not only did the defendant direct the email, Web page, and
defamatory messages at the forum state, but also that the plaintiff felt injury from the online defamatory statements within the forum state); see also Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution
for PersonalJurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565, 574 (1999) (stating that the
Court in Calder "appeared to be moving away from the 'purposeful availment' reasoning
and toward a simpler principle of cause and effect").
145. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
146. Id. at 789 (explaining that both the "respondent's emotional distress and the
injury to her professional reputation was suffered in [the forum state]").
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specific facts and the outcome of the on-line defamatory statement(s).147
Calder emphasizes reasonableness and foreseeability in assessing
jurisdictional standards.14 1 Certain courts, when
faced with the challenge
49
Calder.1
to
turn
activity,
on-line
interpreting
of
The test to be fulfilled is as follows:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) [t]he
plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the
forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by
the plaintiff as a result of that tort; (3) [t]he defendant expressly
aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum can
be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.""
In this test, the emphasis is placed on human volition and intention,
rather than the analysis of the technology of a Web site.
C. The Advent of the Zippo Sliding Scale: Nationwide Interpretations
Zippo's three-pronged sliding scale test allows courts to categorize
Web sites as passive, interactive, or commercially active.' In a strict
application of Zippo in on-line defamation actions, courts would deny
jurisdiction when faced with informational Web sites as sole contacts,
and would find jurisdiction appropriate in cases involving commercial
activity.
In cases involving Web sites falling into the "middle ground" of
interactivity, Zippo suggests a proportionality test to resolve
jurisdictional uncertainties.152 Incongruously, Zippo followers have
actually exercised jurisdiction based on arguably informational Web
147. Id. at 788 (stating that "the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants
out of which the suit arises").
148. Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 726-27 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating
that a defendant should reasonably anticipate being brought into court in the forum state
in order for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 57-58 (D.D.C. 1998) (same).
149. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, Inc. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "jurisdiction may attach if the defendant's conduct is aimed at or has an effect
in the forum state"); Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (maintaining that "[u]nder the 'effects
test' of Calder, we do not find that such defamatory statements amount to actions
'expressly aimed' at Pennsylvania, [the forum state]"); Edias, 947 F. Supp. at 420 (stating
that the plaintiff felt economic injury from the on-line defamation within the forum state).
150. Barrett, 44 F. Supp. at 729-30 (citing Calder and Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG,
155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998) (organizing Calder into three prongs)).
151. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (defining the sliding scale test).
152. Id.; see also Leitstein, supra note 144, at 582 (challenging how the interactive
prong of Zippo "can be distinguished from the doing business rationale," since "doing
business requires commercial activity as well").
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sites.
As demonstrated by the aforementioned cases, courts often ignore a
Web site's passivity if the Web site advertises, or may be categorized as
interactive, in order to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. 5 3 In other cases, courts find jurisdiction applicable whenever
54
a combination of on-line and offline contacts exists within the forum.'
These inconsistent approaches render the assessment and application of
the Zippo test difficult.155 Such variation suggests
that the current trend
156
exists.
trend
no
that
is
tests
in on-line jurisdiction
III. REFOCUSING ON "TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE"

The Supreme Court recognized that in the analysis of jurisdiction, "few
answers will be written 'in black and white.' The greys are dominant and
even among them the shades are innumerable."'57 As the Internet does
little to clear any of that for courts, the concept of due process remains a
pillar for courts to lean on throughout the transition into the age of the
5

Internet.
153. See discussion supra Part l.C.2. But see MICHAEL D. SCOTT, INTERNET AND
TECHNOLOGY LAW DESK REFERENCE 260 (1999) (defining "interactive advertising" as

"[a] type of advertising in which the user chooses and interacts with the advertisement,
instead of being a passive recipient"). The on-line advertisements discussed above,
however, did not have such interactive components. See supra Part I.C.2.
154. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 56 (finding jurisdiction as a result of defendant's
interactive Web site and non-Internet related contacts); Edias, 947 F. Supp. at 421 (same).
155. Compare GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1345
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding no minimum contacts with the forum state and therefore no
jurisdiction); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding no
minimum contacts); Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding no minimum contacts); Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music LP, 33 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 974 (D. Ore. 1999) (holding no minimum contacts); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. CCubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1325 (D. Utah 1998) (holding no minimum contacts),
with CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding
minimum contacts); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 58 (finding minimum contacts);
Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding minimum
contacts); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding
minimum contacts).
156. Matthew Oetker, Note, PersonalJurisdiction and the Internet, 47 DRAKE L. REV.
613, 630-33 (explaining that "amidst the uncertainty of [Internet jurisdiction]," many legal
scholars have attempted to solve problems surrounding Internet jurisdiction, developing
different theories such as: stream of commerce, virtual presence, and single-point
presence).
157. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (stating that the International
Shoe "minimum contacts" test "is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the
facts of each case must be weighed to determine" the existence of jurisdiction).
158. See, e.g., Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 553 (N.J. 2000) (stating that
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A. The Ideas Behind the Zippo Sliding Scale: More Harmful than Helpful
1. Premature Categorizationof Web Sites

Although the Zippo sliding scale test proved helpful to a number of
courts in the initial on-line defamation cases,"' the vague
characterization of Web sites is premature. 6
Depending on the
approach, any one Web site might be6 considered passive, interactive, and
commercially active simultaneously. 1
A Web site contains only information, 6 ' and no human exists behind
the screen pulling levers and pushing buttons to provide responses."'
Computers themselves are "passive" until individuals create Internet
activity.'64 Conversely, Web sites may be labeled "interactive' ' 65 due to
"[r]ather than to attempt to create a new order of jurisdictional analysis adapted to the
Internet, we prefer in this case to adhere to the basics").
159. See supra note 82 (listing cases which applied the Zippo sliding scale test).
160. Anindita Dutta, Trademark: Personal Jurisdiction: Minimum Contacts: Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 303 (1.998)
(noting that "it is understandable why the court's opinion in Zippo breeds only more
confusion," and that "[tihe problem is not only with how the court applies the traditional
analysis of personal jurisdiction to the Internet, but also with how the court ignores the
fact that Dot Corn is a unique type of business that exists almost exclusively in
cyberspace").
161. For example, one company's Web page may simply post information on the
Internet (passive). See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (defining "passive"). However, that information may be advertisements
(commercially active/soliciting business). See generally Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp.
2d 692, 701 -02 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding an on-line advertisement solicited business in the
forum state); Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(same). In addition, the Web page may have a link to an email address (interactive). See
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that "[c]hat rooms, email,
and newsgroups are interactive forms of communication, providing the user with the
opportunity both to speak and to listen"), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
162. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 459 n.2 (D. Mass.
1997) (defining "Web site" as a "group of related documents sharing a Web 'address').
163. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 765 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (stating that "[a] computer is
nothing more than an electronic machine"); see also Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 258, 274 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (explaining that a computer needs an "input device" to
"convert data from an 'ordinary' language form (i.e., English and numbers) to 'machine'
language or electronic signals which are then understandable to a computer").
164. See infra notes 210-11 (explaining how a computer must receive human input in
order to produce a Web site); see also Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 11124 (defining "passive" as
when a defendant "[posts] information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users
in foreign jurisdictions").
165. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 843 (noting that "[c]hat rooms, email, and newsgroups are
interactive forums of communication, providing the user with the opportunity both to
speak and to listen"); see also Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (defining the "middle ground
[as] occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the
host computer").
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routine entries of home or email addresses by Internet users, or by
providing various types of on-line games. Applying this rationale, courts
could hale non-resident defendants into court as a result of a nonresident defendant's on-line card game habit, if the game originated in
the forum state.
Zippo suggests that a "repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet" bestows the status of "clearly [doing] business over the
Internet., 166 The Zippo court geared this prong toward commercial
activity are becoming so
activity; however, those engaging in commercial
1 67
numerous as to render the label worthless.
Traditional contacts remain the only reliable source of determining
minimum contacts with a forum state."' Until the Supreme Court or
Congress provides guidance in the text of an opinion or statute, courts
are left to grapple with 169existing precedent and should forgo the
categorization of Web sites.
2. Commercial Web Sites: The Growth of the Internet Broadens
Applicability
Zippo provides a questionable framework for courts in on-line
defamation cases. The Zippo court recognized that those individuals
clearly doing business over the Internet deserve to be brought into
almost any jurisdiction.1 70 A bright-line test seems to present itself, but
that presumption proves misleading.17 ' The explanation of this prong's
difficulty results from the amount of Web sites that are commercially166. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
167. See infra note 172 (noting the exponential rise in on-line commercial activity); see
also Christopher McWhinney, et al., The "Sliding Scale" of Personal Jurisdiction Via the
Internet, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (warning "smaller start-up companies" to
be "especially wary of the possibility of being named a defendant in a distant forum due to
the company's Internet activity"); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239
(N.D. Il. 1996) (stating that "[b]ecause tnternet communications transmit instantaneously
on a worldwide basis there is little question that the 'in commerce' requirement would be
met in a typical Internet message, be it trademark infringement of false advertising")
(quoting 1 GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE. § 5.11 [2], 5-234 (1996)).

168. But see Sheehan, supra note 31, at 434 (claiming that "[a]fter fifty years of
doctrinal development, the minimum contacts test remains so fact-specific and uncertain
that the outcome of the jurisdictional analysis in any particular case is unpredictable").
169. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (providing authority to intervene in an Internet crisis,
stating that "And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof").
170. See supra note 166 and text accompanying (explaining that a commercially active
Web site is sufficient to exercise jurisdiction).
171. Leitstein, supra note 144 (stating that the "doing business" prong of the Zippo

sliding scale test "is the least helpful").
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active and growing exponentially each year.171
In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,73' the Sixth Circuit recognized the

ease with which anyone may begin an on-line business, stating that "[i]t
enables anyone with the right equipment and knowledge .. to operate

an international business cheaply, and from a desktop.' '

74

If courts

follow Zippo, therefore, it appears that each of these emerging
commercial on-line entities, big and small, may be brought into any
jurisdiction in the United States."' This emerging standard suggests a
marked departure from the notions of traditional jurisdiction which limit
76

a courts' ability to reach commercial defendants from any jurisdiction.1
3. The Zippo Sliding Scale Does Not Recognize TraditionalNotions

The Internet jurisdiction rules of Zippo and its progeny enable courts
to veer off the path of fairness and foreseeability in order to
accommodate expanding litigation. 7 7 Frequently, on-line defamation
opinions exclude discussion of the forum state's interests in jurisdiction,
the plaintiff's interests, judicial economy, and public policy. 78 However,
172. ABA Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, Achieving Legal and Business Order in
Cyberspace 1 (1998) (asserting that "[a]s adaptation to electronic commerce transpires, it
is becoming commonplace to refer to its growth and that of the economy it is creating as
exponential") (quoting Enter the New Web Advisor, MONEY MARKETING, Sept. 9,1999).
173. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 1262.
175. See ABA Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, supra note 172, at 10 (asserting that
"[tlhe hard question for business is which law do (and should) apply to regulate its on-line
activities and what states will enforce those applicable laws or judgments based upon
them").
176. Id. at 10 (claiming that "the need to accommodate traditional governmental
interests in the void created by the apparent transcendence of borders that is an earmark
of on-line commerce"); see also World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296
(1980) (stating that a merchant does not "appoint the chattel his agent for service of
process"). But see Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal Canadian Golf Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 2d
1194 (C.D. Cal. 2000). In this case, a California court denied jurisdiction because of the
Web site's passivity despite its on-line commercial activity, stating that "plaintiff's claims
do not arise from that on-line commercial activity, as required for a federal court to
exercise specific jurisdiction." Id. at 1204.
177. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (stating that "the foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there").
Although the Zippo court divided its opinion into controlling pre-Internet and merely
persuasive post-Internet jurisdictional precedent, the court proceeded to focus only on the
latter in its holding, thus catalyzing the confusion surrounding the ultimate approach to
Internet activity. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
178. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting
evaluative qualities from World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). After consideration
of these factors, the Asahi Court found jurisdiction over the defendant unreasonable as a
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79

not all courts are swayed by new technology.
For example, the Barrett court recognized an unfairness in the on-line
libel case before it and asserted that "non-commercial on-line speech
that does not purposefully target any forum" would not warrant a proper

The Barrett court utilized Supreme Court
exercise of jurisdiction.
its decision to deny jurisdiction in
precedent, including Calder,to ••support
181
an on-line defamation action,
thus sparing the judicial system
unnecessary litigation.82

B. TraditionalContacts:Employing Existing Precedent
"The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be
followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust; forthough their reason be not
times as not
obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former
83

to suppose that they acted wholly without consideration.
Precedent prevents additional problems beyond those already inherent
in the breadth of traditional personal jurisdiction examinations. Those

from
courts relying almost entirely on pre-Internet precedent benefit
8 4
terminology that is general enough to be applied to the Internet.
On-line defamation obviates the need for rules pertaining to those
persons never physically entering the forum, but demands

reasonableness and "fair warning,

as both concepts remain quite

result of the burdens put on the defendant if litigation in the forum state continued. Id. at
114; see also Colleen Reilly, Trademark: Personal Jurisdiction: Minimum Contacts:
Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 271, 286 (1998) (asserting that "[a]
'knew or should have known' standard is essential in Internet personal jurisdiction cases
because of the borderless nature of the medium").
179. See generally Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
180. Id. at 731 (finding that the plaintiff's failure to prove the defendant's minimum
contacts with the forum was sufficient to deny jurisdiction, and therefore the court was not
required to reach the issue of fairness although it briefly addressed the issue).
181. Id. at 729 (finding that the defendant did not "purposefully avail[] herself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state through her Internet activity").
182. Id. (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
183.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70 (1765).

184. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984) (providing the phrase "arise out of or relate to" the purposeful activities of the
defendant); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1958) (providing the phrase
"purposefully derive" benefit); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (providing
that a defendant must "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities

within the forum State"); Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 313, 316 (1945) (providing
language for "minimum contacts").
185. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (ordering "fair warning that a
particular activity may subject a [non-resident] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign");
see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 470 (D. Mass. 1997)
(stating that "a strong showing of reasonableness may serve to fortify a more marginal
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fragile in the realm of cyberspace. A stronger implementation of a "fair
warning" standard alone would prevent litigious plaintiffs from using the

Internet as a net to ensnare non-resident defendants in frivolous
lawsuits. 86
Supporting the notion of fairness in International Shoe,'87 the Court
declared that jurisdictional tests cannot be "simply mechanical or
quantitative," but should focus on the nature of the activity.8' " Although
the technical nature of on-line defamation has changed significantly with

the rise of the Internet, the "effects test" articulated in Calder, in 1984,
remains useful."' 9
The specific nature of on-line defamation, that is, simple words on a

Web site or Web page, remains a tort that easily escapes commerciallybased contacts as well as the necessity of a defendant's physical presence
in the forum state at any time prior or subsequent to its posting. The
passivity of a suspect Web site would eliminate it from a foreign court's
jurisdiction under Zippo principles; however, using traditional contacts
and concepts, a defendant may be more easily brought to justice,

regardless of the categorization of the Web site."'
C. CalderProvides a Satisfactory Standardfor On-line Defamation
Actions
Within on-line defamation actions, the Calder test allows a court to
assess the effects of Web sites in defamation actions, a discretion
necessary for the new technology of the Internet. This tortious branch of
traditional jurisdiction precedent proves essential to all on-line

showing of relatedness and purposefulness") (citing Ticketmaster - N.Y. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d
201,210 (1st Cir. 1994).
186. See supra note 19 (noting the increase of Internet litigation because plaintiffs take
advantage of the new medium in the Internet); see also Jonathan D. Bick, supra note 13
(suggesting that "[legislatures may want to act to restrain frivolous [law]suits").
187. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
188. Id. at 319; see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984)
(emphasizing the necessity to inquire about the nature of the defendant's connection with
the forum).
189. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-91 (1984).
190. Oasis Corp. v. Judd, 132 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622 n.9 (S.D. 2001) (recognizing that the
"vast majority of the 'Internet jurisdiction' case law at this time . . .addresses the
jurisdictional question in the context of commercial Web sites"). The Oasis court
determined that, "[w]hen, as here, the site in question is non-commercial in nature, the
Zippo analysis which seems to be gaining favor in the courts of appeal offers little to
supplement the traditional framework for considering questions of personal jurisdiction."
Id.; see also Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999).
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defamation actions. The courts in Blumenthal,'9' Telco, 92 and Edias9 3 for
example, used Calder principles in the on-line defamation actions before
them. By utilizing the "effects test," arbitrary categories such as
"passive" and "interactive" do not restrict a court's ability to exercise
The Telco court determined that it could exercise
jurisdiction.
jurisdiction over a defendant, despite the Web site's arguable passivity.
If the Telco court had exercised jurisdiction under the Zippo approach, it
the state from exercising jurisdiction over the nonwould have precluded
94
resident defendant.1

Defamatory statements potentially invade all computers worldwide.

95

In addition, the idea behind Calder (i.e., studying the effects of
defamation in the forum state) emphasizes that human motivations and
responses often are ignored in on-line defamation cases. For example, if
a defendant directs Internet contacts at the forum state and causes
foreseeable harm there, it is reasonable for him to anticipate being haled
into court in that state.' 96
The Third Circuit recently established a three-part test that plaintiffs
must fulfill in order to rely upon Calder principles.' 97 The Third Circuit
set up its prongs in the fashion of Imo Industries, Inc v. Kiekert AG. 98
The test demands that an intentional tort exists, that the brunt of the
harm caused by the tort be felt in the forum state (i.e., the "focal point"
of the harm), and that "the defendant must have expressly aimed the
tortious conduct at the forum" state (the "focal point of the tortious
191. 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Telco Communications v. An Apple a
Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding jurisdiction over defendant because
the plaintiff experienced "the primary and most devastating effects" in the forum state).
192. 977 F. Supp. at 408 (finding jurisdiction because the plaintiff suffered harm in the
forum state as a result of defamatory statements posted on-line).
193. 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996) (citing Calder and finding jurisdiction over
the defendant because the plaintiff felt the harm of the defamation in the forum state); see
also Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 717, 729-30 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Calder and
Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1999), organizing Calder into
three prongs).
194. Compare Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 408 (finding jurisdiction based on the harm
suffered in the forum state regardless of the passivity of the defendant's Web site), with
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (explaining
that a passive Web site precludes jurisdiction).
195. See supra notes 11, 13, 14 (noting the exceptional speed and peculiar nature of the
Internet).
196. See id.
197. Metallic Ceramic Coatings, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., No. 00-CV-4941, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1224 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2001) (relying upon Remick v. Manfredy, 238
F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001)).
198. Id.; see also Imo Indus., 155 F.3d at 256.
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activity").' 99
In sum, the Imo test relies upon a statement on which the Third Circuit
and this Comment relies: the defendant must "manifest behavior
intentionally targeted at and focused on [the forum]" for Calder to be
satisfied•'2°

Some courts turn away from an "effects" standard in favor of a longarm statute. 20 ' For example, the Northwest court denied jurisdiction
based on where the defamatory statement originated and never touched
upon the effects of that defamation.2 '
The danger of rejecting
defamation actions without analyzing the extent of the effects in the
forum statewithdefmatin
becomes
ad evident
esape if non-resident
""
203 defendants target a forum
with defamation and escape punishment.
However, the Northwest
court may prove utilitarian if this ruling prevents frivolous lawsuits
instigated by those attempting to bring non-residents into court solely in
the name of the Internet.
D. Avoiding Analysis of Web Site Activity: Refocusing on Human,
Volitional Conduct
In order to stay within the bounds of "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice, '2" 4 it is necessary to emphasize volitional,
physical, and human contacts. 2"' As an Oregon district court recently
stated, "there must be 'deliberate action' by the defendant within the

199. Metallic, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1224, at *14-15 (citing Imo Indus., 155 F.3d at
256).
200. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, 126 F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir. 1997). This statement
was quoted in both the Imo and Metallic courts. Imo Indus., 155 F.3d at 265; Metallic,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1224, at *14.
2(11. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
202. Id. at 593 (stating the necessity to focus on the act of making the defamatory
statement as the "operative act for the purpose of determining whether the act was [in the
forum] for the purpose of [jurisdiction under] the long-arm statute").
203. Id. at 592, 596. As a result of Minnesota's long-arm statute, the Northwest court
stated that defamation through an email is committed in the state in which the message is
drafted, and the reception of the message in Minnesota is not sufficient to establish
jurisdiction in the state. Id. at 594. As a result of assessing the origin of the defamation
and not its effects, the non-resident defendants who released the defamatory statements
via email escaped their day in court.
204. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 313, 316 (1945) (citation omitted).
205. Cf.Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 468 (D. Mass.
1997) (declaring that "contacts with the forum state must be voluntary - not based on the
unilateral actions of another party or a third person"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958) (declaring that a volitional act is one "by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws").
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forum state., 20 6 Although each on-line defamation case deserves factsensitive and circumstantial analysis,0 7 certain standards must remain
foundational to prevent propulsion toward nationwide jurisdiction. 20 8
Courts concerned with a Web page's perpetual accessibility, rather
than the non-resident defendant's intentions and an Internet user's
actions, go astray. 20 9 Despite an individual's ability to view an Internet
Web site twenty-four hours a day, that Web site must be sought out by
the user.210 The computer must be turned on, and the user must give that
computer search information to provoke a specific home page's
211
appearance.
User commands and actions must be explored by the
court to assess whether minimum contacts with the forum state have
been made;2 12 however, without knowledge of a user's actions, a forum

206. Millennium Enter. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921 (D. Ore.
1999) (stating that "deliberate action" must exist between the defendant and forum state
residents in order to exercise jurisdiction) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90
(1984)).
207. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (noting that "the 'minimum contacts'
test of InternationalShoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather the facts of
each case must be weighed) (quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
208. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that no "nationwide jurisdiction
for defamation actions" exists).
209. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
the Inset court's holding that continuous on-line advertising is an activity sufficiently
directed toward a forum state to justify jurisdiction in that state); see Gigante, supra note
127, at 315 (using Inset as an example of how "[s]ome of the early Internet jurisdiction
decisions rested on less-than-rigorous due process analysis").
210. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (N.D. 111.1996) (explaining
that "[w]hen the Web server receives an inquiry from the Internet, it returns the Web page
data in the file to the computer making the inquiry"); see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that "[e]very Web page has its
own Web site, which is its address, similar to a telephone number or street address").
211. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(noting that "it takes several steps to enter cyberspace"). In Reno, the court stated that:
At the most fundamental level, a user must have access to a computer with the
ability to reach the Internet (typically by way of a modem). A user must then
direct the computer to connect with the access provider, enter a password, and
enter the appropriate commands to find particular data.
Id. at 844; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 952 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (explaining that "if users know or can deduce the address of a Web site, they
can type the address of a Web site as if dialing a telephone number" or a user relies on
"'search engines' available on the Web to search for key words and phrases associated
with the desired Web site") (quoting Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1298).
212. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that "due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it"); cf.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (ordering "fair warning that a particular
activity may subject a [non-resident] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign").
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should not be deemed proper. 2 3 The mere possibility of contacts does
not satisfy the constitutional threshold of traditional jurisdiction. 4
None of the courts deciding on-line defamation cases based
jurisdiction on on-line advertisements, nor supported their decisions with
data or statistics quoting the frequency with which those advertisements
were visited by Internet users within the forum.2 5 When assessing the
applicability of jurisdiction, a court should determine whether or not the
216
on-line advertisement specifically targets the forum state. If the forum
state was targeted, then traditional rules should apply as necessary;
however, if the advertisement is simply accessible to Internet users and
no data exists to support forum residents' exposure, the constitutional
requirement of minimum contacts has not been met.27
213. Cf. ROBERT B. GELMAN WITH STANTON MCCANDLISH, PROTECTING
YOURSELF ON-LINE 29 (1998) (warning Internet users to avoid problems by
"remember[ing] that you're using a tool that's part telephone, part postal medium, part
broadcasting").
214. See supra note 24 and accompanying discussion (stating that a defendant should
have contacts sufficient enough with the forum that he or she "reasonably anticipates"
being brought to court in that forum state).
215. See generally Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding
jurisdiction over a non-resident as a result of advertising over the Internet); Telco
Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn 1996) (same).
216. Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406. Although Telco's advertising satisfied Virginia's longarm statute, the "passive" on-line advertisements were insufficient to provide adequate
grounds for jurisdiction because advertising seems only to "make information available to
those who are interested in it." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4) (Michie 1950). If all
courts may exercise jurisdiction over those companies or persons possessing on-line
advertisements (arguably "passive" sites), the ease with which an individual sends a
defamatory message into cyberspace, purposefully or not, soon will equal the ease with
which any one court may bring that individual under its jurisdiction. Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1,124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also Hornell Brewing
Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998). In this case, an Indian
tribe alleged the name of the beer "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor" to be defamatory. Id. at
1089. The brewing company advertised the liquor over the Internet; however, the Hornell
court held that Internet advertising did not directly effect tribal health or welfare. Id. at
1093. The court denied that the Indian Tribal Court had jurisdiction, finding Internet use
similar to the "use of the airways for national broadcasts over which the Tribe can claim
no proprietary interest." Id. Therefore, Internet advertisement was not sufficient to
establish jurisdiction. Id. Within a month of the Hornell decision, the Ninth Circuit also
held that an Internet advertisement did not establish jurisdiction. Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). In this trademark infringement case, the
court used Zippo for guidance, holding that the "passive nature of [defendant's] activity in
posting a home page" could not be categorized as "purposeful." Id. at 420. The court
declared that exercising jurisdiction as a result of on-line advertising would undermine
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 415.
217. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Sears, 744 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (D. Del. 1990) (holding
that advertisements appearing in two international magazines were insufficient for
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For further illustration, compare on-line defamation and defamation
218 The Internet is not
that occurs in a magazine article, as in Calder.
"circulated" in a state or another country simply because those residents
have access to it-those residents must actively seek out the Web site just
as they would actively seek out a specific magazine to buy.219 A Web
site's "circulation" in this analogy, therefore, would be equivalent to the
number of residents visiting that site.
Some Internet Web sites have "hit counters" that record the number of
people visiting the Web site on any particular day, aiding in the

determination of a Web site's "circulation" in a defamation action.22°
Further, certain Web sites, typically commercial Web sites, have users
electronically
sign an on-line contract that warns a user of jurisdictional
• " .• 221"
ramifications.
These examples of human contribution allow a court to
assess the level of contact existing between a Web site and users in a
222
forum state.
establishing personal jurisdiction); Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40, 43
(8th Cir. 1988) (holding that an advertisement placed in a nationally distributed trade
publication circulated in the forum state does not constitute a "purposeful availment of
the benefits and protections of [the forum's] law"). Attorneys in other countries recognize
on-line advertising and Internet jurisdiction to be problematic as well. See Monique
Conrod, Website Advertising Raises Troubling Jurisdictional Issues, THE LAWYERS
WEEKLY (Canada), October 31, 1997.
218. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (finding jurisdiction over defendants who
made libelous statements in a magazine article because of the large distribution of that
magazine in the forum state).
219. See supra notes 210-11 (illustrating how an Internet user seeks out a Web site).
220. ScoTr, supra note 153, at 236 (defining "hit" as a "log entry on the Web server
that shows that an item was retrieved from a particular Web page on that server... [tihe
number of hits recorded for a Web site provides a very rough estimate of the number of
users who have accessed the Web site"); see also EDWARDS & WAELDE, supra note 11, at
32 (stating that "[o]ne way to assess [on-line activity] is by the 'hit rate,' [which] is a count
of how many times the Web site is accessed in a given period of time"); GELMAN supra
note 213, at 27 (explaining that "[u]nless you happen to have advanced computer-network
knowledge, you leave a trail that a skilled investigator could trace you by every time you
log on").
221. See, e.g., LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ON-LINE WORLD, 266
(1995) (providing an example of a contract for "User Agreement for On-line Services"
with a choice of law clause). But see Lars Davies, Contract Formation on the Internet:
Shattering a few myths, in LAW AND THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE 97, 99
(1997) (stating that "[t]he contractual terms which purport to define the law and
jurisdiction must be valid and the validity is determined by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the contract is formed regardless of any term within the contract itself").
222. GELMAN, supra note 213, at 44 (stating that on-line services can "track and
record user activities"). On-line activities such as "which newsgroups or files a subscriber
has accessed and which Web sites a subscriber has visited" may be recorded and "collected
both by a subscriber's own service provider and by the sysops of remote sites that a
subscriber has visited." Id.
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This jurisdictional problem is not easily solved.223 As a Minnesota
appellate court stated, "[i]t will undoubtedly take some time to
determine the precise balance between the rights of those who use the
Internet to disseminate information and the powers of the jurisdictions in
which receiving
computers are located to regulate for the general
224
welfare.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Internet does not exist in a vacuum, but exists as a product of
human volition. The courts should treat it as such. An individual should
not be subjected to all existing jurisdictions when entering cyberspace,
but should be assured that he or she will receive the benefits of
constitutional due process.
The Internet provides new technology, but does not provide novel
legal questions. The nature of defamation, although technically altered
as a result of Internet distribution, retains the same basic tenets as in the
pre-Internet era. Therefore, jurisdictional tests for defamation actions
should remain in tact as in the days before on-line activity. Just as in
1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes stated in The Common Law, "[i]f truth
were not often suggested by error, if old implements could not be
adjusted to new uses, human progress would be slow." '
As
jurisdictional tests are "adjusted" for applicability to Internet
defamation, courts must be cautious not to discard the underlying
constitutional principles of personal jurisdiction.

223. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). The Court stated:
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through
the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can
become a pamphleteer .....
"[T]he content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought."
Id.
224. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating further that "our task here is limited to deciding the question of personal
jurisdiction in the instant case").
225. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).

